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Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org.

Mostrando postagens com marcador OMC. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador OMC. Mostrar todas as postagens

sexta-feira, 24 de novembro de 2017

A destruicao do sistema multilateral de comercio por Mister Trump (news)

Absolutamente inédito na história econômica mundial: o país que inagurou o moderno sistema mundial de comércio, baseado no multilateralismo aberto, está agora, por iniciativa de um presidente absolutamente idiota, desmantelando o sistema, destruindo suas bases, retirando as condições de funcionamento do sistema baseado na OMC.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

COMÉRCIO INTERNACIONAL E PROMOÇÃO COMERCIAL

Trump rejeita texto da OMC e abre crise na entidade

Países-membros denunciam tentativa da Casa Branca de esvaziar entidade e de bloquear funcionamento dos tribunais da organização
Jamil Chade CORRESPONDENTE / GENEBRA

O Estado de S. Paulo, 23/11/2017 

 

O governo dos EUA se recusou ontem a apoiar texto da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC) que tratava da importância em manter o sistema multilateral de comércio e da abertura dos mercados. A ação foi interpretada como um ato deliberado para minar a entidade.
O governo dos Estados Unidos se recusou ontem a apoiar o texto de declaração ministerial da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC), levando as negociações para um acordo na entidade, que se reúne em dezembro em Buenos Aires, a um impasse. A Casa Branca ainda anunciou no mesmo dia que vetaria a nomeação de novos juízes para os tribunais da
OMC, abalando o sistema de solução de controvérsias.
Num texto que falaria da importância em se manter o sistema multilateral do comércio, da abertura dos mercados e de se buscar formas de encontrar acordos para agricultura, pesca e outros setores, o comportamento dos EUA foi interpretado como um ato deliberado para minar a entidade.
A Casa Branca alegou que o texto não atendia a suas expectativas, acusando-o de dar atenção excessiva a questões de desenvolvimento e que não aceitaria a declaração sobre a “centralidade” do sistema multilateral do comércio.
Durante a reunião do G-20, Trump já havia se recusado a aceitar uma linguagem parecida. Um processo semelhante foi registrado na Organização para Cooperação e Desenvolvimento Econômico (OCDE) e mesmo na Cooperação Econômica Ásia-Pacífico (Apec). Desta vez, não seria diferente no caso da OMC.
A partir de agora, o processo apenas pode ser resgatado por uma decisão política, num acordo entre ministros. O governo argentino, anfitrião do encontro, garantiu ontem que não vai desistir do processo. Para o porta-voz da OMC, Keith Rockwell, governos fizeram avanços importantes nos últimos dias. “Mas não atingiram a meta”, disse. “O bastão agora será passado aos ministros”, explicou.
Mas, entre as delegações, o gesto dos EUA foi interpretado como um sinal claro de que a administração de Donald Trump não está interessada em fortalecer a OMC. Durante sua campanha eleitoral, o americano chegou a ameaçar uma retirada da entidade e, por meses, o esforço do brasileiro Roberto Azêvedo, diretor-geral da OMC, foi a de garantir que os canais com a Casa Branca estivessem abertos.
A interpretação, agora, é de que Washington poderá privilegiar apenas acordos bilaterais ou mecanismos pelos quais ele possa manter o controle.
O golpe, se consumado, pode ter um sério impacto para os países emergentes, entre eles o Brasil, que dependem das regras internacionais para ter alguma chance de evitar medidas protecionistas e corrigir distorções. O fracasso desta semana, depois de dez dias de negociações, deixou vários governos em alerta.
Esvaziar. Mas o golpe contra a entidade não ocorreu apenas na declaração de Buenos Aires. Governos ainda denunciam a tentativa da administração de Donald Trump de esvaziar a OMC, impedindo que seu órgão máximo de solução de disputas possa nomear juízes para avaliar os casos. Ontem, a entidade realizou a última reunião do ano para debater a situação do funcionamento de seus tribunais. O governo americano, uma vez mais, rejeitou qualquer iniciativa para preencher as vagas abertas entre os juízes.
O resultado da posição americana é que, a partir de dezembro, a OMC contará com apenas quatro membros do órgão de solução de disputas, instância que serve como uma espécie de Supremo Tribunal do comércio e que tradicionalmente dispõe de sete juízes. Hoje, o órgão conta com cinco membros. Mas o mandato de um deles termina no dia 11 de dezembro e não há substituto designado.
Com praticamente metade de seus delegados, o tribunal máximo do comércio está ameaçado, justamente num momento em que as disputas tiveram um salto importante.
“A entidade foi criada para o benefício de todos, menos o nosso.” Donald Trump PRESIDENTE DOS EUA EM ENTREVISTA À FOX NEWS
Escolha de juízes
Em fevereiro, a OMC precisa dar início à seleção dos novos juízes, porque os mandatos vão vencer. Mas o governo Trump tem usado diferentes justificativas para frear o processo. No início do ano, Washington apontava que a transição entre as administrações exigia um certo tempo da Casa Branca para avaliar suas posições no comércio global.
Mas, em meados do ano, problemas técnicos foram alegados para impedir que a nomeação de novos juízes fosse realizada. Documentos revelados na semana passada pela imprensa americana, porém, revelam que o governo Trump já tratava da questão das nomeações desde fevereiro, na surdina.
Roberto Azêvedo, diretorgeral da OMC, chegou a tratar do assunto em uma viagem a Washington em setembro e a esperança era de que a crise pudesse ser superada antes do fim do ano.
Ontem, porém, a administração Trump voltou a bloquear a escolha de novos membros. Como resposta, 52 países se uniram para propor que a escolha dos novos árbitros ocorra no início de 2018, evitando assim a paralisia da entidade. Para a delegação brasileira, o que mais preocupa é que os americanos não estão dando esclarecimentos sobre o que deve ser feito para que seu veto seja alterado. Para o Itamaraty, o risco é de que o órgão passe a ser “disfuncional”.

Valor Econômico – EUA barram declaração ministerial da OMC

Assis Moreira | De Estocolmo
 Faltando menos de três semanas para a grande conferência ministerial da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC) na Argentina, um impasse provocado na prática pela política de Donald Trump de "America First", caracterizada pelo nacionalismo econômico, explodiu de vez ontem na entidade.
O embaixador da África do Sul, Xavier Carim, presidente do Conselho Geral, orgão máximo da OMC, decidiu suspender as negociações entre os mais de 160 países sobre a declaração ministerial na conferência na Argentina, na qual teria destaque a defesa do sistema multilateral de comércio.
Isso porque a delegação dos EUA, que insiste que os países devem discutir o futuro da OMC, deixou claro que não havia condições para declaração, em meio à reação dos outros países que temem efeitos do isolacionismo americano.
Se nem a declaração ministerial pode ser negociada, todo o resto corre o risco de ficar paralisado. Temas que são discutidos, como a proibição de alguns subsídios para o setor pesqueiro, sofrem freio brutal, com Washington empurrando a conferência para o fiasco.
A presidente da conferência, Susana Malcorra, ex-ministra das Relações Exteriores da Argentina, insiste que, face à "incerteza política e econômica crescente", o que conta não são apenas os aspectos técnicos das questões em discussão, mas princípios do comércio internacional fundado em regras transparentes e comuns.
O que os negociadores do governo Trump deixaram claro na OMC foi a posição predominante na Casa Branca. Trump reclama do sistema multilateral e não hesita em acusar a OMC de fazer os EUA baixarem suas próprias barreiras comerciais, enquanto outros países não fariam o mesmo, e de tratar os EUA de maneira injusta.
Em recente viagem à Ásia, Trump fez forte defesa do nacionalismo econômico, deixando claro o pouco interesse pelo sistema multilateral. "Farei acordos comerciais bilaterais com qualquer nação do Indo-Pacífico que queira ser nosso parceiro e respeite os princípios de comércio leal e recíproco", afirmou ele no Vietnã.
Segundo Trump, os EUA sob sua liderança não mais entrarão em acordos comerciais grandes, "que amarram, que prendem nossas mãos, entregam nossa soberania e cuja execução significativa é praticamente impossível".
Na cúpula da Ásia-Pacífico, no Vietnã, com muito custo os países chegaram a uma declaração reconhecendo "o trabalho da OMC em assegurar comércio internacional baseado em regras, livre, aberto, justo e transparente". Eles se comprometeram a cooperar para melhorar o funcionamento do órgão xerife do comércio internacional.
O que pode acontecer em Buenos Aires é uma declaração pessoal da presidente da conferência ilustrando o que ela ouviu dos países. Algum entendimento global sobre qualquer tema, no entanto, por ora parece quase impossível.

quinta-feira, 2 de novembro de 2017

OMC e o futuro do comercio internacional: China como economia de mercado - WSJ

Um dos mais importantes artigos que já li no Wall Street Journal: simplesmente o futuro do comércio internacional com a admissão (ainda oficiosa) da China como "economia de mercado" na OMC, e um estudo dos casos sendo examinados sob o seu sistema de solução de controvérsias. Repito: IMPORTANTE, para os que seguem o comércio internacional.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Globalization in Retreat

How China Swallowed the WTO

By Jacob M. Schlesinger
The Wall Street Journal, November 2, 2017
The U.S. helped create the group to smooth global commerce and integrate a rising China. Instead, it’s become a battleground for intense national rivalries

GENEVA—Inside the cement compound housing the World Trade Organization lies a colorful Chinese garden of cultivated rocks, arches and calligraphy. The gift from the Chinese commerce ministry symbolizes “world prosperity through cross-cultural fertilization,” according to a marble plaque.
It’s not the only way China has left its mark on the institution.
Sixteen years after becoming a member, the world’s second-largest economy is in an increasingly tense standoff with the U.S. and Europe that threatens to undermine the WTO’s authority as an arbiter of global trade.
The Chinese garden at the World Trade Organization’s Geneva headquarters. 
The Chinese garden at the World Trade Organization’s Geneva headquarters. Photo: Xinhua/ZUMA PRESS
 
Rather than fulfilling its mission of steering the Communist behemoth toward longstanding Western trading norms, the WTO instead stands accused of enabling Beijing’s state-directed mercantilism, in turn allowing China to flood the world with cheap exports while limiting foreign access to its own market.
“The WTO’s abject failure to address emerging problems caused by unfair practices from countries like China has put the U.S. at a great disadvantage,” Peter Navarro, a trade adviser to President Donald Trump, said in an interview. “The message to the WTO from this administration has been clear. Things have to change.”
Such criticism has percolated over many years in the U.S. with growing bipartisan intensity. Now it is coming to a head under the first American presidency of an open free-trade skeptic, in a case just starting to wend its way through the Geneva process. The issue: whether China has graduated to a “market economy,” a change of status that would make it considerably harder for other nations to block imports they believe are improperly aided by Chinese government distortions.
China has sued both the U.S. and European Union demanding the change, calling it “nonnegotiable,” and Chinese officials are likely to reiterate that demand when they talk trade next week with President Trump during his Beijing visit. Steelworkers have jammed the streets of Belgium and Germany protesting that ultimatum, while Europe’s parliament voted 546 to 28 to fight it, one Italian lawmaker saying acceptance “would be carrying out the suicide of the European industry.”

Focusing Eastward


As China’s share of global trade has grown rapidly...
Each nation's trade as a share of the global total
Exports
Imports
18
%
18
%
16
16
14
14
U.S.
China
12
12
10
10
U.S.
8
8
China
6
6
4
4
2
2
0
0
’15
’15
’05
’05
2000
1995
’10
’10
1995
2000
...the U.S. and other countries have ramped up accusations of unfair trading practices, and invoked those allegations to block Chinese imports.
Percentage of U.S. imports from China covered by restrictions
Imports affected by U.S. trade restrictions
9
%
China
Antidumping
8
S. Korea
7
Mexico
2016 estimate
6
2017 estimate
India
5
Japan
4
Canada
3
Antisubsidy*
Germany
2
France
1
U.K
0
$30
$20
$40
$10
$50
$0
billion
1995
2000
’05
’15
’10
*Countervailing duties
Sources: World Bank (exports and imports); Chad Bown, Peterson Institute for International Economics (restrictions)
“This is without question the most serious litigation matter we have at the WTO right now,” Robert Lighthizer, the Trump administration’s trade representative, told Congress in June. A China victory, he added, “would be cataclysmic for the WTO.”
Washington’s role challenging the WTO marks a reversal from the giddy mid-1990s heyday of globalization, and a reminder of how nationalism is increasingly the byword in global economic competition. When the WTO was forged in Morocco as a new international trade overseer, replacing the less-powerful General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Cold War had ended and the U.S., as the sole superpower, saw a chance to weave economies together around American-style capitalism.
GATT and the WTO have, over the past seven decades, greased the wheels of interdependence. Under Geneva’s guidance, tariffs world-wide have plunged nearly 80% and trade’s share of the global economy has more than doubled. More than 160 countries representing 98% of world commerce are now WTO members, and most of the few remaining nonmembers—like Belarus and Timor-Leste—are negotiating to join.
The WTO’s defenders say it still plays an important role. Roberto Azevedo, the director-general of the WTO, credits his organization with preventing a recurrence after the 2008 financial crisis of the trade wars that exacerbated the Great Depression. “If we didn’t have the WTO, we would be in much worse shape,” Mr. Azevedo said in an interview.
Mr. Azevedo, who as a Brazilian trade diplomat successfully used WTO courts to challenge American cotton subsidies, plays down U.S. complaints that his body isn’t properly equipped to handle China. “We have 164 countries,” he said. “China is one of those countries that have their own practices, their own methodologies. The system was designed to respond to that diversity.”
A view inside the WTO headquarters.
A view inside the WTO headquarters. Photo: Laurent Gillieron/Keystone/Associated Press
But critics say the system is badly in need of an overhaul. After the violent 1999 street battles that killed the Seattle round and the effective 2015 death of the Doha Development Round, the world trade regime has now gone nearly a quarter-century without a comprehensive rules upgrade—the longest such period since World War II.
These failures have elevated the importance and prominence of the WTO’s judicial system, as countries concluded their only option for advancing their cause in Geneva was litigation, not negotiation.
At the WTO, disputes are handled before “panels,” not “courts,” terminology carefully chosen in deference to home-country political concerns about sovereignty. In a similar vein, judges are called “members,” and wear business attire, not robes, though they do preside from an elevated bench.
The courts are structured as an arbitration system, with a dispute-settlement panel and a more powerful appellate body. WTO officials call the process their “crown jewel” and say members comply with 90% of its rulings.
One of the most active litigants has been Beijing.

Clogging the Courts


A growing number of those disputes have landed before the WTO...
Disputes involving the U.S.
Disputes filed with the WTO involving China
As respondent
Third party
Complainant
Complainant
Third party
As respondent
35
35
30
30
25
25
20
20
15
15
10
10
5
5
0
0
’17*
’15
’05
’00
’10
1995
’15
’17*
1995
’10
’05
’00
...helping feed a backlog, which is straining the WTO's legal system, extending the duration of cases, and fueling dissatisfaction with the process at a time when challenges rise against China. Complaints can take more than four years to be resolved.
Active WTO disputes per year
Length of dispute process, 1995–2016
Actual avg.
Official deadline for each step
40
35
From request to panel
30
25
From panel to report
20
Appeals (2-3 mos.)
15
Agreed time to
implement agreement
10
Compliance panel
5
From compliance
appeal to final report
0
12
6
18
0
months
’15
’10
2000
’05
’17*
1995
*Through October †Through September
Sources: WTO (dispute counts, disputes per year); Louise Johannesson and Petros C. Mavroidis (length of dispute process)
China’s 2001 WTO entry was a transformative moment. Negotiations took 15 years—longer than those creating the WTO itself—and included more strings and conditions than had been imposed on any other member. The shared, underlying assumption was that China’s economy was undergoing a historic transition from state-run to market-oriented, and that WTO membership would ensure, and accelerate, that evolution.
Most countries combine their WTO diplomatic corps with delegations to other global bodies in Geneva. Beijing built a mammoth stand-alone “Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to World Trade Organization” about a mile up the shore of Lake Geneva, flying the large red flag with yellow star.
The Chinese government was at first shy about using the WTO courts, modeled after the unfamiliar Western legal system, and filed just one complaint in its first five years after joining. But the surge in Chinese exports following its WTO entry, which suddenly made it the world’s largest exporter, thrust Beijing into the center of the legal system.
Since 2007, China has been party to more than a quarter of all WTO cases, as trading partners scrambled to erect barriers protecting their industries while demanding better access to China’s markets.
Facing such pressures, Chinese officials set about to master the process. China sought out disputes in which it had no direct stake and joined more than 100 as a “third party,” giving officials access to proceedings as observers. The Chinese offered large stipends to prominent American and European trade-law scholars to teach seminars in China for young bureaucrats. They retained top U.S. law firms. Steptoe & Johnson LLP became the go-to firm for combating a new American policy imposing extra-steep duties on Chinese imports aided by allegedly illegal subsidies; one member of the Steptoe China team had staffed the WTO appellate body for six years.
Chinese steel is among the many trade items in dispute between the U.S. and China.
Chinese steel is among the many trade items in dispute between the U.S. and China. Photo: Wang He/Getty Images
Beijing’s lawyers started notching notable court wins over the Americans who shaped the system. In a series of rulings from 2011 through May 2017, the appellate body concluded that Washington had cut too many corners in asserting that the state underwrites Chinese exports. Those decisions, covering four dozen industries, from off-road tires to wind towers to, literally, kitchen sinks, raised the bar for U.S. policy makers trying to block Chinese imports. And they complicated American efforts to impose higher duties on Chinese goods.
WTO defenders note the U.S. has still won the vast majority of cases it has filed in Geneva, and say it should be pleased that China has chosen to pursue its trade grievances through global arbiters.
“Since our accession to the WTO, China has always followed the WTO rules,” Cui Tiankai, China’s ambassador to the U.S., said in a recent interview with a Chinese TV station. “Sometimes we don’t have 100% agreement with them, but still we play by the rules. I hope America could do the same.”
The losses rankled the Washington trade community. In May 2016, aides to then-President Barack Obama cited two rulings favoring China as part of a broader list of grievances designed to block the reappointment of a South Korean judge on the appellate body.
At a tense meeting at WTO headquarters, the U.S. delegate told fellow trade diplomats that the judge, South Korean law professor Seung Wha Chang, had shown a pattern of judicial overreach and suggested that he had acted as an “independent investigator or prosecutor” on behalf of parties such as Beijing.
It was seen as a surprisingly hostile act in the genteel Geneva community. Thirteen veteran WTO jurists complained the U.S. had traversed “a Rubicon that must not be crossed,” putting “the very future of the entire WTO trading system at risk.” Mr. Chang himself responded through an interview with a Korean newspaper, saying he had been made a scapegoat. He added that the U.S. may have wanted him removed before the trade court heard a pending challenge to American restrictions on South Korean washing machine exports., an insinuation U.S. officials have rejected.
The WTO includes more than 160 countries representing 98% of world commerce.
The WTO includes more than 160 countries representing 98% of world commerce. Photo: Denis Balibouse/REUTERS
The Chang tensions exposed a bigger problem: The WTO’s failure to complete negotiating rounds aimed at updating rules for 21st-century business has forced judges to use often-outdated 1990s guidelines in settling disputes. That has fed complaints that the WTO courts were relying increasingly on their own interpretations of those rules, engaging in judicial overreach and activism.
Peter Van den Bossche, a Belgian judge on the appellate body, wrote a 2015 essay warning of the “dangerous institutional imbalance in the WTO between its ‘judicial’ branch and its political ‘rule-making’ branch,” that could “drastically weaken” the system.
Since the WTO doesn’t have detailed rules governing Chinese-type state-owned-enterprises, some observers say jurists have had to make decisions case by case.
The Trump administration has escalated the Obama administration’s battle over the appellate body, blocking appointments of any new judges and sparking fights even with members sympathetic to the U.S. campaign against China. By year’s end, the seven-member appellate body will have three vacancies, heightening worries about its ability to manage a mounting backlog and a looming “tsunami of cases,” as one judge warned in a recent speech. At an Aug. 31 meeting of the committee overseeing the courts, the U.S. said it would block any attempt to fill those slots until its “longstanding” complaints about the courts were addressed.
That’s just one of many ways Mr. Trump is testing the WTO. He’s staffing his trade team with longtime WTO detractors. As private lawyers, both Mr. Lighthizer and Gilbert Kaplan, nominated to be the Commerce Department’s trade point-man, helped shape strategy for U.S. industries combating Chinese imports after its WTO entry. Both won protections from the U.S. government—Mr. Lighthizer for steel pipes, Mr. Kaplan for various types of paper—that were later deemed improper by the WTO appellate body for taking too many liberties in asserting Chinese misbehavior.
There’s no sign Mr. Trump intends to follow through on the idea he once floated during the 2016 campaign of pulling the U.S. out of the organization. But aides have said they are exploring a number of policies that openly challenge the WTO’s authority, reflecting their skepticism about the body’s ability to handle China. They have openly discussed imposing sanctions unilaterally against China. Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross in April launched an official study of “the structural problem” of the WTO and its courts, arguing the body has “an institutional bias…toward the exporters rather than toward the people that are being beleaguered by inappropriate imports.”

Who Wins at the WTO

The success rate of WTO members in filing claims, or defending against them, at the dispute panel level


Won claims it filed against
another member
Won claims filed against it
U.S.
E.U.
Canada
Korea
Mexico
Japan
Brazil
Argentina
India
China
60
40
20
80
0%
Note: Includes cases from 1995 through Feb. 23, 2016; countries shown were involved in at least 10 cases.
Source: Louise Johannesson and Petros C. Mavroidis
Research shows WTO courts tend to favor countries suing to challenge trade barriers over those defending them. In a study of all WTO disputes litigated from 1995 through early 2016 for the Journal of World Trade, Louise Johannesson and Petros Mavroidis concluded the plaintiffs won 71% of the claims filed at the panel level. But their data also show the U.S. is one of the most successful plaintiffs, winning far more of the cases at the panel level that it initiates than China does.
A looming challenge to the WTO is the pending case determining China’s official status in the world trading system—whether members are now required to treat it as a “market” economy. The debate is complicated because there appears to be no clear answer in WTO rules, which some participants say were left intentionally vague in the agreement governing China’s entry.
Beijing reads the pact as having automatically guaranteed it market status 15 years after its December 2001 accession. The U.S., Europe, Japan and others say the change was intended to be a privilege contingent on liberalization promises Beijing has yet to keep.
The penalty China pays for its WTO label as a “nonmarket economy” is high, as would be China’s benefits for wiping it away. The “nonmarket” designation makes it easier for trading partners to impose inflated tariffs on goods they conclude have been “dumped”—or sold below “fair” value. That’s because prices and costs are seen as so distorted in a “nonmarket economy” that other countries are given wide latitude to determine on their own what they consider “fair.” That contrasts with a stricter burden of proof and analysis required when leveling the same charges against a “market economy.”
A flip from “nonmarket” to “market” would boost EU imports from China by as much as 21%, or $84 billion, according to a 2016 study by CEPII, a French-government affiliated think tank on international economics. The same report noted the U.S. uses the nonmarket discretion more aggressively than the EU, both slapping penalties on a greater portion of Chinese imports and applying a steeper rate. The study concluded that Washington applied an average duty of 162% against Chinese goods, compared with a 33% rate for market economies.
China has waged a diplomatic campaign asking nations to grant it market status, winning over more than 70 countries, mainly in Africa, Latin America and Asia. On Dec. 12, 2016—the day after the 15th anniversary of its accession—Beijing filed separate complaints in Geneva against the U.S. and the EU demanding similar treatment from them, arguing that the stance of the two Western powers “nullify or impair benefits accruing to China.”
The European case is moving first, and a panel was appointed in July with veteran arbiters from Jamaica, Switzerland and New Zealand. The deliberations are likely to take more than a year, but interest is already intense, an unusually high 20 countries registering as “third parties,” including Ecuador, Russia, Tajikistan, and Japan.
WTO defenders and critics alike say the Geneva courts are the wrong way to resolve what are ultimately political and economic questions left ambiguous in the underlying rules.
“That gray zone is the key point of tension,” says Chad Bown, a WTO expert at the pro-free-trade Peterson Institute for International Economics. “How you deal with that is ultimately going to determine whether the WTO system in its current form can hang together or not.”
Write to Jacob M. Schlesinger at jacob.schlesinger@wsj.com