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Mostrando postagens com marcador China. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador China. Mostrar todas as postagens

sábado, 11 de novembro de 2017

Mister Trump goes to Asia: a self-inflicted decline on the USA (NYT)

Asia Pacific

Trump Pitches ‘America First’ Trade Policy at Asia-Pacific Gathering


DANANG, Vietnam — President Trump on Friday vowed to protect American interests against foreign exploitation, preaching a starkly unilateralist approach to a group of leaders who once pinned their economic hopes on a regional trade pact led by the United States.
“We are not going to let the United States be taken advantage of anymore,” Mr. Trump told business leaders at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in Danang, Vietnam. “I am always going to put America first, the same way that I expect all of you in this room to put your countries first.”
But taking the stage at the same meeting immediately after Mr. Trump, President Xi Jinping of China delivered a sharply contrasting message, championing more robust engagement with the world. Mr. Xi used his own speech to make a spirited defense of globalization, saying relations among countries should be “more open, more inclusive, more balanced, more equitable and more beneficial to all.”
Mr. Trump’s remarks were strikingly hostile for an audience that included leaders who had supported the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a sweeping 12-nation accord that was to be led by the United States, from which Mr. Trump withdrew immediately after taking office.
And it indicated the degree to which, under Mr. Trump, the United States — once a dominant voice guiding discussions about trade at gatherings such as APEC — has ceded that role. Even as he was railing against multilateral approaches, the remaining 11 countries in the Trans-Pacific Partnership were negotiating intensively to seal the agreement — without the United States. Under the terms being discussed, the United States could re-enter the pact in the future.

Even without the United States, the Trans-Pacific Partnership would be the largest trade agreement in history. Under the partnership, members would enjoy tariff-free trade with each other, with companies in the member countries having faster and better access to other markets than their American rivals.
Promising to pursue “mutually beneficial commerce” through bilateral trade agreements, Mr. Trump roundly condemned the kind of multilateral accords his predecessors had pursued. His talk echoed his statements in China earlier this week that blamed weak American leadership for trade imbalances that he said had stripped jobs, factories and entire industries from the United States.
“What we will no longer do is enter into large agreements that tie our hands, surrender our sovereignty and make meaningful enforcement practically impossible,” Mr. Trump said.
He also spoke witheringly about an approach he said had led the United States to lower its own trade barriers, only to have other countries refuse to do so, and he accused the World Trade Organization of treating the United States unfairly.
Many of the president’s toughest lines — his vow to fight the “audacious theft” of intellectual property from American companies and the forced transfer of technology to foreign firms — were aimed at China.
But Mr. Trump avoided criticizing Mr. Xi personally. And he repeated his contention that he did not blame China, or any other country, for taking advantage of what he called weak American trade laws.
“If their representatives are able to get away with it, they are just doing their jobs,” the president said. “I wish previous administrations in my country saw what was happening and did something about it. They did not, but I will.”
 
White House officials had framed Mr. Trump’s speech as a chance to articulate the idea of a “free and open Indo-Pacific” region, which the Trump administration has adopted as its answer to former President Barack Obama’s pivot to Asia. First proposed by the Japanese, it envisions the United States strengthening ties with three other democracies in the region — Australia, India and Japan — in part to counter a rising China. But the president offered few details about that approach.
He spoke of the need for freedom of navigation — a reference to the South China Sea, which Vietnam, Malaysia and other countries complain Beijing is turning into a private waterway. But the president stopped short of calling out China by name.
He also did not fault China or his host, Vietnam, for their checkered human rights records, even as he offered a general endorsement of the rule of law and individual rights.
As in his speech to the United Nations in September, Mr. Trump emphasized the idea of sovereignty, a concept that is often seen as being at odds with global cooperation and that is sometimes used by countries to fend off interference by outside powers.
He closed the speech with an inward-looking paean to the virtues of home, declaring, “In all of the world, there is no place like home,” adding that nations should “protect your home, defend your home, and love your home today and for all time.”
Mr. Xi, in contrast, argued for pursuing the kinds of global initiatives that Mr. Trump had shunned. The Chinese leader praised the Paris climate accord, called globalization an “irreversible historical trend” and said China would continue to pursue a free trade area in the Asia-Pacific region.
American and Russian officials had been working to arrange a meeting between President Vladimir V. Putin and Mr. Trump on the sidelines of the meeting, in part to ask for Moscow’s assistance in countering the threat from North Korea. But as Mr. Trump arrived in Danang, the White House announced that he would not hold formal talks with Mr. Putin.
Officials cited scheduling issues as the reason the two leaders would not meet. But on Thursday, Rex W. Tillerson, the secretary of state, had said that a conversation between Mr. Trump and Mr. Putin was “still under consideration,” and that a final decision would hinge on whether there was “sufficient substance” to warrant face-to-face talks.
Mr. Trump’s last encounter with Mr. Putin — on the sidelines of the Group of 20 summit meeting in Hamburg, Germany — posed political challenges for the White House, which faced questions about whether and how sharply Mr. Trump would rebuke his Russian counterpart for meddling in the 2016 elections.
Mr. Trump was later criticized for not having pressed Mr. Putin more strongly in an hourslong meeting on the election interference, and for revelations that the two had a second, undisclosed discussion at a leaders’ dinner that night. Diplomats described being stunned to see the two presidents chatting intimately with only a Kremlin interpreter present.
The optics of a meeting this week would have been particularly tricky, given new revelations about the Trump campaign’s contacts with Russians, brought to light by the investigations into Moscow’s efforts to sway the American election in Mr. Trump’s favor.
The two presidents did end up shaking hands and exchanging greetings before posing for a photograph at the APEC gala dinner Friday evening.
Still, the change in plans appeared to have left the Kremlin exasperated. Asked about the absence of a meeting, Sergey V. Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, told a Russian TV reporter: “Ask the Americans. We are not speaking on this matter at all.”
Mr. Lavrov noted that Mr. Trump himself had said last week that he would most likely meet with Mr. Putin during his trip to Asia. But, Mr. Lavrov added, “I don’t know what his bureaucrats are saying.”

quinta-feira, 2 de novembro de 2017

OMC e o futuro do comercio internacional: China como economia de mercado - WSJ

Um dos mais importantes artigos que já li no Wall Street Journal: simplesmente o futuro do comércio internacional com a admissão (ainda oficiosa) da China como "economia de mercado" na OMC, e um estudo dos casos sendo examinados sob o seu sistema de solução de controvérsias. Repito: IMPORTANTE, para os que seguem o comércio internacional.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Globalization in Retreat

How China Swallowed the WTO

By Jacob M. Schlesinger
The Wall Street Journal, November 2, 2017
The U.S. helped create the group to smooth global commerce and integrate a rising China. Instead, it’s become a battleground for intense national rivalries

GENEVA—Inside the cement compound housing the World Trade Organization lies a colorful Chinese garden of cultivated rocks, arches and calligraphy. The gift from the Chinese commerce ministry symbolizes “world prosperity through cross-cultural fertilization,” according to a marble plaque.
It’s not the only way China has left its mark on the institution.
Sixteen years after becoming a member, the world’s second-largest economy is in an increasingly tense standoff with the U.S. and Europe that threatens to undermine the WTO’s authority as an arbiter of global trade.
The Chinese garden at the World Trade Organization’s Geneva headquarters. 
The Chinese garden at the World Trade Organization’s Geneva headquarters. Photo: Xinhua/ZUMA PRESS
 
Rather than fulfilling its mission of steering the Communist behemoth toward longstanding Western trading norms, the WTO instead stands accused of enabling Beijing’s state-directed mercantilism, in turn allowing China to flood the world with cheap exports while limiting foreign access to its own market.
“The WTO’s abject failure to address emerging problems caused by unfair practices from countries like China has put the U.S. at a great disadvantage,” Peter Navarro, a trade adviser to President Donald Trump, said in an interview. “The message to the WTO from this administration has been clear. Things have to change.”
Such criticism has percolated over many years in the U.S. with growing bipartisan intensity. Now it is coming to a head under the first American presidency of an open free-trade skeptic, in a case just starting to wend its way through the Geneva process. The issue: whether China has graduated to a “market economy,” a change of status that would make it considerably harder for other nations to block imports they believe are improperly aided by Chinese government distortions.
China has sued both the U.S. and European Union demanding the change, calling it “nonnegotiable,” and Chinese officials are likely to reiterate that demand when they talk trade next week with President Trump during his Beijing visit. Steelworkers have jammed the streets of Belgium and Germany protesting that ultimatum, while Europe’s parliament voted 546 to 28 to fight it, one Italian lawmaker saying acceptance “would be carrying out the suicide of the European industry.”

Focusing Eastward


As China’s share of global trade has grown rapidly...
Each nation's trade as a share of the global total
Exports
Imports
18
%
18
%
16
16
14
14
U.S.
China
12
12
10
10
U.S.
8
8
China
6
6
4
4
2
2
0
0
’15
’15
’05
’05
2000
1995
’10
’10
1995
2000
...the U.S. and other countries have ramped up accusations of unfair trading practices, and invoked those allegations to block Chinese imports.
Percentage of U.S. imports from China covered by restrictions
Imports affected by U.S. trade restrictions
9
%
China
Antidumping
8
S. Korea
7
Mexico
2016 estimate
6
2017 estimate
India
5
Japan
4
Canada
3
Antisubsidy*
Germany
2
France
1
U.K
0
$30
$20
$40
$10
$50
$0
billion
1995
2000
’05
’15
’10
*Countervailing duties
Sources: World Bank (exports and imports); Chad Bown, Peterson Institute for International Economics (restrictions)
“This is without question the most serious litigation matter we have at the WTO right now,” Robert Lighthizer, the Trump administration’s trade representative, told Congress in June. A China victory, he added, “would be cataclysmic for the WTO.”
Washington’s role challenging the WTO marks a reversal from the giddy mid-1990s heyday of globalization, and a reminder of how nationalism is increasingly the byword in global economic competition. When the WTO was forged in Morocco as a new international trade overseer, replacing the less-powerful General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Cold War had ended and the U.S., as the sole superpower, saw a chance to weave economies together around American-style capitalism.
GATT and the WTO have, over the past seven decades, greased the wheels of interdependence. Under Geneva’s guidance, tariffs world-wide have plunged nearly 80% and trade’s share of the global economy has more than doubled. More than 160 countries representing 98% of world commerce are now WTO members, and most of the few remaining nonmembers—like Belarus and Timor-Leste—are negotiating to join.
The WTO’s defenders say it still plays an important role. Roberto Azevedo, the director-general of the WTO, credits his organization with preventing a recurrence after the 2008 financial crisis of the trade wars that exacerbated the Great Depression. “If we didn’t have the WTO, we would be in much worse shape,” Mr. Azevedo said in an interview.
Mr. Azevedo, who as a Brazilian trade diplomat successfully used WTO courts to challenge American cotton subsidies, plays down U.S. complaints that his body isn’t properly equipped to handle China. “We have 164 countries,” he said. “China is one of those countries that have their own practices, their own methodologies. The system was designed to respond to that diversity.”
A view inside the WTO headquarters.
A view inside the WTO headquarters. Photo: Laurent Gillieron/Keystone/Associated Press
But critics say the system is badly in need of an overhaul. After the violent 1999 street battles that killed the Seattle round and the effective 2015 death of the Doha Development Round, the world trade regime has now gone nearly a quarter-century without a comprehensive rules upgrade—the longest such period since World War II.
These failures have elevated the importance and prominence of the WTO’s judicial system, as countries concluded their only option for advancing their cause in Geneva was litigation, not negotiation.
At the WTO, disputes are handled before “panels,” not “courts,” terminology carefully chosen in deference to home-country political concerns about sovereignty. In a similar vein, judges are called “members,” and wear business attire, not robes, though they do preside from an elevated bench.
The courts are structured as an arbitration system, with a dispute-settlement panel and a more powerful appellate body. WTO officials call the process their “crown jewel” and say members comply with 90% of its rulings.
One of the most active litigants has been Beijing.

Clogging the Courts


A growing number of those disputes have landed before the WTO...
Disputes involving the U.S.
Disputes filed with the WTO involving China
As respondent
Third party
Complainant
Complainant
Third party
As respondent
35
35
30
30
25
25
20
20
15
15
10
10
5
5
0
0
’17*
’15
’05
’00
’10
1995
’15
’17*
1995
’10
’05
’00
...helping feed a backlog, which is straining the WTO's legal system, extending the duration of cases, and fueling dissatisfaction with the process at a time when challenges rise against China. Complaints can take more than four years to be resolved.
Active WTO disputes per year
Length of dispute process, 1995–2016
Actual avg.
Official deadline for each step
40
35
From request to panel
30
25
From panel to report
20
Appeals (2-3 mos.)
15
Agreed time to
implement agreement
10
Compliance panel
5
From compliance
appeal to final report
0
12
6
18
0
months
’15
’10
2000
’05
’17*
1995
*Through October †Through September
Sources: WTO (dispute counts, disputes per year); Louise Johannesson and Petros C. Mavroidis (length of dispute process)
China’s 2001 WTO entry was a transformative moment. Negotiations took 15 years—longer than those creating the WTO itself—and included more strings and conditions than had been imposed on any other member. The shared, underlying assumption was that China’s economy was undergoing a historic transition from state-run to market-oriented, and that WTO membership would ensure, and accelerate, that evolution.
Most countries combine their WTO diplomatic corps with delegations to other global bodies in Geneva. Beijing built a mammoth stand-alone “Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to World Trade Organization” about a mile up the shore of Lake Geneva, flying the large red flag with yellow star.
The Chinese government was at first shy about using the WTO courts, modeled after the unfamiliar Western legal system, and filed just one complaint in its first five years after joining. But the surge in Chinese exports following its WTO entry, which suddenly made it the world’s largest exporter, thrust Beijing into the center of the legal system.
Since 2007, China has been party to more than a quarter of all WTO cases, as trading partners scrambled to erect barriers protecting their industries while demanding better access to China’s markets.
Facing such pressures, Chinese officials set about to master the process. China sought out disputes in which it had no direct stake and joined more than 100 as a “third party,” giving officials access to proceedings as observers. The Chinese offered large stipends to prominent American and European trade-law scholars to teach seminars in China for young bureaucrats. They retained top U.S. law firms. Steptoe & Johnson LLP became the go-to firm for combating a new American policy imposing extra-steep duties on Chinese imports aided by allegedly illegal subsidies; one member of the Steptoe China team had staffed the WTO appellate body for six years.
Chinese steel is among the many trade items in dispute between the U.S. and China.
Chinese steel is among the many trade items in dispute between the U.S. and China. Photo: Wang He/Getty Images
Beijing’s lawyers started notching notable court wins over the Americans who shaped the system. In a series of rulings from 2011 through May 2017, the appellate body concluded that Washington had cut too many corners in asserting that the state underwrites Chinese exports. Those decisions, covering four dozen industries, from off-road tires to wind towers to, literally, kitchen sinks, raised the bar for U.S. policy makers trying to block Chinese imports. And they complicated American efforts to impose higher duties on Chinese goods.
WTO defenders note the U.S. has still won the vast majority of cases it has filed in Geneva, and say it should be pleased that China has chosen to pursue its trade grievances through global arbiters.
“Since our accession to the WTO, China has always followed the WTO rules,” Cui Tiankai, China’s ambassador to the U.S., said in a recent interview with a Chinese TV station. “Sometimes we don’t have 100% agreement with them, but still we play by the rules. I hope America could do the same.”
The losses rankled the Washington trade community. In May 2016, aides to then-President Barack Obama cited two rulings favoring China as part of a broader list of grievances designed to block the reappointment of a South Korean judge on the appellate body.
At a tense meeting at WTO headquarters, the U.S. delegate told fellow trade diplomats that the judge, South Korean law professor Seung Wha Chang, had shown a pattern of judicial overreach and suggested that he had acted as an “independent investigator or prosecutor” on behalf of parties such as Beijing.
It was seen as a surprisingly hostile act in the genteel Geneva community. Thirteen veteran WTO jurists complained the U.S. had traversed “a Rubicon that must not be crossed,” putting “the very future of the entire WTO trading system at risk.” Mr. Chang himself responded through an interview with a Korean newspaper, saying he had been made a scapegoat. He added that the U.S. may have wanted him removed before the trade court heard a pending challenge to American restrictions on South Korean washing machine exports., an insinuation U.S. officials have rejected.
The WTO includes more than 160 countries representing 98% of world commerce.
The WTO includes more than 160 countries representing 98% of world commerce. Photo: Denis Balibouse/REUTERS
The Chang tensions exposed a bigger problem: The WTO’s failure to complete negotiating rounds aimed at updating rules for 21st-century business has forced judges to use often-outdated 1990s guidelines in settling disputes. That has fed complaints that the WTO courts were relying increasingly on their own interpretations of those rules, engaging in judicial overreach and activism.
Peter Van den Bossche, a Belgian judge on the appellate body, wrote a 2015 essay warning of the “dangerous institutional imbalance in the WTO between its ‘judicial’ branch and its political ‘rule-making’ branch,” that could “drastically weaken” the system.
Since the WTO doesn’t have detailed rules governing Chinese-type state-owned-enterprises, some observers say jurists have had to make decisions case by case.
The Trump administration has escalated the Obama administration’s battle over the appellate body, blocking appointments of any new judges and sparking fights even with members sympathetic to the U.S. campaign against China. By year’s end, the seven-member appellate body will have three vacancies, heightening worries about its ability to manage a mounting backlog and a looming “tsunami of cases,” as one judge warned in a recent speech. At an Aug. 31 meeting of the committee overseeing the courts, the U.S. said it would block any attempt to fill those slots until its “longstanding” complaints about the courts were addressed.
That’s just one of many ways Mr. Trump is testing the WTO. He’s staffing his trade team with longtime WTO detractors. As private lawyers, both Mr. Lighthizer and Gilbert Kaplan, nominated to be the Commerce Department’s trade point-man, helped shape strategy for U.S. industries combating Chinese imports after its WTO entry. Both won protections from the U.S. government—Mr. Lighthizer for steel pipes, Mr. Kaplan for various types of paper—that were later deemed improper by the WTO appellate body for taking too many liberties in asserting Chinese misbehavior.
There’s no sign Mr. Trump intends to follow through on the idea he once floated during the 2016 campaign of pulling the U.S. out of the organization. But aides have said they are exploring a number of policies that openly challenge the WTO’s authority, reflecting their skepticism about the body’s ability to handle China. They have openly discussed imposing sanctions unilaterally against China. Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross in April launched an official study of “the structural problem” of the WTO and its courts, arguing the body has “an institutional bias…toward the exporters rather than toward the people that are being beleaguered by inappropriate imports.”

Who Wins at the WTO

The success rate of WTO members in filing claims, or defending against them, at the dispute panel level


Won claims it filed against
another member
Won claims filed against it
U.S.
E.U.
Canada
Korea
Mexico
Japan
Brazil
Argentina
India
China
60
40
20
80
0%
Note: Includes cases from 1995 through Feb. 23, 2016; countries shown were involved in at least 10 cases.
Source: Louise Johannesson and Petros C. Mavroidis
Research shows WTO courts tend to favor countries suing to challenge trade barriers over those defending them. In a study of all WTO disputes litigated from 1995 through early 2016 for the Journal of World Trade, Louise Johannesson and Petros Mavroidis concluded the plaintiffs won 71% of the claims filed at the panel level. But their data also show the U.S. is one of the most successful plaintiffs, winning far more of the cases at the panel level that it initiates than China does.
A looming challenge to the WTO is the pending case determining China’s official status in the world trading system—whether members are now required to treat it as a “market” economy. The debate is complicated because there appears to be no clear answer in WTO rules, which some participants say were left intentionally vague in the agreement governing China’s entry.
Beijing reads the pact as having automatically guaranteed it market status 15 years after its December 2001 accession. The U.S., Europe, Japan and others say the change was intended to be a privilege contingent on liberalization promises Beijing has yet to keep.
The penalty China pays for its WTO label as a “nonmarket economy” is high, as would be China’s benefits for wiping it away. The “nonmarket” designation makes it easier for trading partners to impose inflated tariffs on goods they conclude have been “dumped”—or sold below “fair” value. That’s because prices and costs are seen as so distorted in a “nonmarket economy” that other countries are given wide latitude to determine on their own what they consider “fair.” That contrasts with a stricter burden of proof and analysis required when leveling the same charges against a “market economy.”
A flip from “nonmarket” to “market” would boost EU imports from China by as much as 21%, or $84 billion, according to a 2016 study by CEPII, a French-government affiliated think tank on international economics. The same report noted the U.S. uses the nonmarket discretion more aggressively than the EU, both slapping penalties on a greater portion of Chinese imports and applying a steeper rate. The study concluded that Washington applied an average duty of 162% against Chinese goods, compared with a 33% rate for market economies.
China has waged a diplomatic campaign asking nations to grant it market status, winning over more than 70 countries, mainly in Africa, Latin America and Asia. On Dec. 12, 2016—the day after the 15th anniversary of its accession—Beijing filed separate complaints in Geneva against the U.S. and the EU demanding similar treatment from them, arguing that the stance of the two Western powers “nullify or impair benefits accruing to China.”
The European case is moving first, and a panel was appointed in July with veteran arbiters from Jamaica, Switzerland and New Zealand. The deliberations are likely to take more than a year, but interest is already intense, an unusually high 20 countries registering as “third parties,” including Ecuador, Russia, Tajikistan, and Japan.
WTO defenders and critics alike say the Geneva courts are the wrong way to resolve what are ultimately political and economic questions left ambiguous in the underlying rules.
“That gray zone is the key point of tension,” says Chad Bown, a WTO expert at the pro-free-trade Peterson Institute for International Economics. “How you deal with that is ultimately going to determine whether the WTO system in its current form can hang together or not.”
Write to Jacob M. Schlesinger at jacob.schlesinger@wsj.com

sábado, 28 de outubro de 2017

Protecionismo comercial brasileiro: alem de prejudicial, ridiculo - Marcos S. Jank, Jose Tavares Araujo

O interesse público na defesa comercial

Jornal “Folha de São Paulo”, Caderno Mercado, 28/10/2017

Marcos Sawaya Jank (*)
José Tavares de Araujo Jr. (**)

A Camex precisa analisar em profundidade o "interesse público" por trás das sobretaxas do aço

Os defensores da escalada de medidas antidumping aplicadas pelo governo brasileiro desde 2006 costumam argumentar, corretamente, que tais medidas são legítimas e amparadas pelas normas da OMC (Organização Mundial do Comércio). Legais e legítimas, sem dúvida, mas não necessariamente razoáveis e benéficas para a economia como um todo.

Por isso, antes de qualquer decisão, é fundamental verificar os ganhos e as perdas do processo e avaliar se há real interesse público nas medidas propostas.

Um exemplo recente do grau de insensatez da nossa política comercial reside na indústria de laminados de aço a quente, cujos preços afetam, virtualmente, as estruturas de custos de todo o sistema industrial. Entre 2010 e 2016, as importações desse produto caíram de US$ 734 milhões para US$ 88 milhões, ou seja, praticamente desapareceram. 

Mesmo assim, no ano passado o governo tomou duas providências excêntricas. Em julho, abriu uma investigação antidumping contra as importações de aço oriundas da China e da Rússia, que vai seguramente aumentar ainda mais o preço do aço vendido no mercado interno. 

Esse preço tem sido bem superior ao que o Brasil pratica nas exportações do produto. Tanto que há duas semanas a União Europeia impôs elevadas sobretaxas antidumping contra o aço exportado pelo Brasil, usando os mesmos argumentos que o país quer fazer valer contra a China. Não há logica alguma nessa corrente protecionista anacrônica, que, aliás, cria precedentes para outros tipos de aço. Não é para menos que 23 associações de indústrias usuárias de aço se uniram formando uma coalizão contra a sobretaxa.

Não bastasse o antidumping, em novembro o Brasil iniciou processo sobre os subsídios supostamente concedidos pelo governo chinês aos fabricantes de laminados de aço. É a primeira vez que o Brasil contesta os subsídios chineses.

Os chineses entendem que, se o Brasil for adiante e aplicar direitos compensatórios contra os subsídios, estaria claramente tomando partido ao lado dos EUA e da Europa na matéria, países que até aqui lideram essa modalidade de defesa comercial. A retaliação mais evidente cairá sobre as nossas exportações do agronegócio, como já está ocorrendo no caso do açúcar –com a imposição de uma salvaguarda global que só atingiu o Brasil– e da carne de frango, cuja petição inicial sugere a aplicação de taxas antidumping da ordem de 40%.

Alguns dirão que isso tudo tem a ver com a polêmica do reconhecimento da China como economia de mercado. Mas, no nosso entendimento, o que realmente está em jogo é a falta de visão estratégica sobre o interesse nacional em geral e os rumos da política comercial em particular.

Há 15 anos rejeitamos a construção de blocos econômicos com países americanos e europeus. Agora estamos irritando a China, a Rússia e outros parceiros emergentes, com esse neoprotecionismo surreal cumulativo, que prejudica a nossa competitividade e capacidade de inserção nas cadeias globais de valor.

É fundamental que a Camex analise em profundidade o "interesse público" que haveria por trás das sobretaxas de antidumping e anti-subsídios no aço. No nosso entendimento, elas vão fortalecer o poder de mercado dos fabricantes de aço, prejudicar o resto da economia e irritar o principal parceiro comercial do país, atingindo o agronegócio exportador.

Em vez de ficar atirando bravatas xenofóbicas contra a competitividade conquistada pelo resto do mundo, deveríamos, sim, refletir seriamente sobre os vetores que nos jogaram para trás nesses últimos anos e avançar nas reformas estruturais que nos recolocariam no planeta. 

(*) Marcos Sawaya Jank é especialista em questões globais do agronegócio. Escreve aos sábados, a cada duas semanas.
(**) José Tavares de Araujo Jr. é doutor em economia pela Universidade de Londres e sócio da Ecostrat Consultores. Email: jtavares@ecostrat.net